

Attitudes on Family Law as an Electoral Cleavage: Survey Evidence from Tunisia

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Contextual Background: August 13, 2018



Figure: Source: www.carthage.tn

Contextual Background



Figure: Source: <https://www.arab48.com>

Theory: The Cleavage Model

- Forces effecting social relationships that shape and condition voting behavior (Bartollini and Mair, 1990)
- Empirical, normative and organizational elements
- Structural cleavages: industrialization and nationalization (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967)
- Issue based cleavages: post-materialism, reproduction, foreign policy (Deegan-Krause, 2007; Karvonen Kuhnle, 2003; Lijphart, 1984)
 - Non-existent or weak outside of industrialized Western democracies (Dalton Zhu, 2008; Deegan-Krause, 2007)
 - Timing of industrialization, property rights, absence of stable party platforms (Bornschier, 2009; Innes, 2002; Zielinski, 2002).

Cleavages on Family Law

- An alternative source of electoral cleavage
- Family law: “legal norms governing the formation and internal relations of ... social units (Htun and Weldon, 2015)”
- Derives its source from Islamic law: Muslim world
- A major subject of debates
 - Questions on Islam, secularism, women’s rights and identity
- Approval from masses for reformation

Cleavage Formation on Family Law

- Empirical element: Family Law
- Organizational element: push from the elite and opposition to the reformation
- Normative element: religious justification
 - “For the male, what is equal to the share of two females...”

Contextual background: Family Law in Tunisia

- Debates regarding changing the inheritance law in the Code of Personal Status
- Enacted in 1956, derives its source from Islamic jurisprudence.
- Gains for women
 - Child custody, divorce, polygamy
- Inheritance: 2 vs. 1 as specified in Qur'an (Surah al-Nisaa)
- Absolute majority is required for the change.

Tunisia continued

- First Republic's legacy on family law
- MTI and early Ennahda: Confrontation with the regime on Family Code
- Ennahda: Evolving attitudes on the CPS
- Protests and debates for equality following the revolution
- Nidaa Tounes: Regime-successor party inheriting the legacy on women's rights

Hypothesis on Inheritance

- **Hypothesis 1:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights are less likely to vote for Ennahda than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights are more likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights.

Hypothesis on Divorce

- **Hypothesis 3:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights are less likely to vote for Ennahda than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights.
- **Hypothesis 4:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights are less likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights.

- Afrobarometer (2013)
- “If national elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?” n=1192, Ennahda=180 (15%), Nidaa=150 (12%) Undecided, do not know, would not vote, refused to answer=745 (61.4%).

- “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men”




Figure: Individual Views about Women’s Inheritance Rights

“Women and men should have equal rights in making a decision to divorce.”




Figure: Individual Views about Women's Divorce Rights

Model Selection and Control Variables


- Multinomial Logistic Regression
 - Base party: Ennahda
 - Parties: Niddaa Tounes, Other, No Vote
- Control Variables
 - Education
 - Economic evaluations
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Religiosity-excluded in the main model

Table: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (Baseline: Ennahda)

	Nidaa Tounes	Other	No Vote
Intercept	1.13 (0.70)	0.43 (0.72)	2.98*** (0.53)
Inheritance	0.25** (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)	0.14* (0.07)
Women's Rights	-0.37** (0.14)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.10)
Education	0.12* (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)
Female	-0.35 (0.25)	0.26 (0.26)	0.07 (0.19)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Divorce	-0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.07)
Economic Evaluations (Tunisia)	-0.79*** (0.14)	-0.54*** (0.14)	-0.46*** (0.09)
Economic Evaluations (Self)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.09)
AIC	2330.79		
BIC	2465.85		
Log Likelihood	-1138.39		
Deviance	2276.79		
Num. obs.	1099		

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Inheritance




Opinions on Women's Equal Inheritance Rights

Note: Only voting intentions for the two largest parties are included in the graph

Figure: Predicted Probabilities for Inheritance Based on MNL

Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Inheritance



Opinions on Women's Equal Inheritance Rights

Note: Analysis Based on Only those with Voting Choices

Figure: Predicted Probabilities for Inheritance Based on MNL (Restricted Sample)

Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Divorce




Figure: Predicted Probabilities for Divorce Based on MNL

Discussion: Elite Interview

- Culture War

- Fadhel Ben Omrane, Nidaa Tounes MP: "Essebsi was elected by women who do not like Nidaa to be in parallel with Ennahda, as they consider Ennahda to be a very dangerous organization. [By calling for equality in inheritance] Essebsi wanted to send a message to his electorate that he is for women. Now although we do not speak on this issue [inheritance], we still consider it as important for us (07/12/2019)"

Discussion

Inheritance vs divorce rights

- Religious sources: moral and ethical maxims
- Heterodoxy
- Sociological practices
- Voting behavior in emerging democracies (Dalton and Klingemann, 2009)
- Enduring cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967)
- 2019 Elections in Tunisia: Kais Saied vs Nabil Karoui

Implications for Other Countries

Country	Court	Source	Politiciz	Manif	Protests	ID
Egypt	Islamic	Islamic	Lim	YES	YES	NO
Turkey	Secular	Secular	NO	YES	NO/NA	NO
Tunisia	Secular	Islamic	YES	YES	YES	YES
Morocco	Secular	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Algeria	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Jordan	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Kuwait	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	NO/NA	NO
Palestine	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	NO/NA	NO
Yemen	Islamic	Islamic	NA	NO/NA	YES	NO

Table: A Comparison of Provisions and Popular Engagement on Family Law across MENA

Thank you for listening

Questions and Comments

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Research Question

- Do opinions about family law shape the voting behavior for the largest conservative party and the regime successor party in Tunisia?
 - **Ennahda:** The largest conservative party with Islamist roots.
 - **Nidaa Tounes:** Regime successor party formed by the former elite of the First Republic.
 - Afrobarometer (2013) dataset

Hypothesis 3: General attitudes on Women's Rights

- Islamic discourse
- Economic challenges
- **Hypothesis 3:** Individuals who hold less egalitarian attitudes on women's rights are more likely to vote for Ennahda than individuals who hold more egalitarian attitudes on women's rights

- Statement 1: “In Tunisia, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Statement 2: “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.”





Figure: Individual Views about Women's Rights

Post-Estimation (Women's Rights)

Post Estimation Analysis of Women's Rights on Supporting Ennahda



Discussion

- Ennahda's political stance
 - Ambiguous on inheritance issue until 2018
 - Salafis vs a more egalitarian base
 - 2018 announcement
 - Economic challenges in Tunisia, rise of "The Block", experiences with governance

Table: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (Baseline: Ennahda)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Nidaa (1)	CPR (2)	Workers (3)	Front (4)	Other (5)	No Vote (6)
Inheritance	1.280*** (0.086)	1.227* (0.116)	1.155 (0.147)	0.965 (0.198)	1.228 (0.138)	1.155** (0.069)
Women's Rights	0.686*** (0.139)	1.188 (0.173)	1.285 (0.229)	0.849 (0.286)	0.885 (0.216)	0.852* (0.097)
Education	1.132** (0.054)	1.081 (0.076)	1.225** (0.096)	0.920 (0.125)	1.162* (0.086)	0.960 (0.043)
Female	0.702 (0.252)	1.453 (0.352)	2.529* (0.482)	0.960 (0.543)	0.835 (0.408)	1.077 (0.192)
Age	1.006 (0.008)	1.000 (0.012)	0.998 (0.017)	0.953** (0.022)	0.989 (0.014)	1.002 (0.007)
Divorce	0.912 (0.097)	1.153 (0.145)	1.401 (0.225)	1.033 (0.201)	0.912 (0.157)	0.928 (0.073)
Economic Evaluations (Tunisia)	0.451*** (0.136)	0.850 (0.178)	0.372*** (0.288)	0.724 (0.331)	0.379*** (0.258)	0.627*** (0.094)
Economic Evaluations (Self)	1.154 (0.116)	0.742* (0.171)	1.125 (0.200)	0.593* (0.279)	1.142 (0.179)	0.936 (0.092)
Constant	3.095 (0.699)	0.215 (1.000)	0.038** (1.486)	8.069 (1.430)	1.045 (1.147)	19.751*** (0.531)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,677.671					

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table: Logistic Regression Analysis

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	-2.76 *** (0.43)	-2.21 *** (0.32)	-2.79 *** (0.28)	-5.27 *** (1.22)	-2.34 *** (0.49)
Inheritance	-0.19 ** (0.07)	-0.19 ** (0.07)	-0.17 † (0.09)	-0.17 ** (0.07)	-0.18 ** (0.07)
Divorce	0.03 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)
Female	-0.11 (0.18)		-0.07 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.18)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)			0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Education	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Economy (Egocentric)	0.06 (0.09)				
Economy (Sociotropic)	0.53 *** (0.09)		0.56 *** (0.07)		
Women's Rights		0.19 * (0.09)		0.12 (0.12)	0.18 * (0.09)
Inheritance*Female			-0.03 (0.13)		
Economy (PCA)				0.11 (0.11)	0.10 (0.10)
Religiosity				1.09 ** (0.37)	
Women's Rights*Female				0.13 (0.18)	
<i>N</i>	1132	1121	1138	1078	1099
AIC	889.77	923.78	896.34	881.94	904.39
BIC	1050.79	1024.22	1037.38	1081.25	1064.46
log <i>L</i>	-412.89	-441.89	-420.17	-400.97	-420.20

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

	Women's Rights	Inheritance	Age	Female	Religiosity	Divorce	Education	Economy (Egocentric)	Economy (Sociotropic)	Economy (PCA)
Women's Rights	1									
Inheritance	-0.2	1								
Age	-0.03	0.02	1							
Female	-0.17	0.17	-0.05	1						
Religiosity	0	-0.02	0	0.03	1					
Divorce	-0.23	0.25	-0.01	0.15	0.01	1				
Education	-0.08	-0.11	-0.38	-0.14	0.01	0.14	1			
Economy (Egocentric)	0	-0.04	-0.08	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.25	1		
Economy (Sociotropic)	0.03	-0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.47	1	
Economy (PCA)	0.02	0.01	0.13	-0.06	-0.01	-0.07	-0.23	-0.8	0.16	1

Restricted Sample




Figure: Marginal Effects (Restricted Sample)